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As referred to in this report, the Affordable Care Act comprises the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act and the health care provisions of the Health Care and Education 
Reconciliation Act of 2010, as affected by subsequent judicial decisions, statutory changes, 
and administrative actions.
Numbers in the text and tables may not add up to totals because of rounding.
Unless otherwise indicated, all years are federal fiscal years, which run from October 1 to 
September 30.
Unless otherwise indicated, estimates of insurance coverage throughout this report reflect 
average enrollment over the course of a calendar year and include spouses and dependents 
covered under family policies; people with multiple sources of coverage are placed in a single 
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CBO
Updated Estimates of the Effects of the 
Insurance Coverage Provisions of the 
Affordable Care Act, April 2014
Summary
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and the staff of 
the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) have updated 
their estimates of the budgetary effects of the provisions 
of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) that relate to health 
insurance coverage. The new estimates, which are 
included in CBO’s latest baseline projections, reflect 
CBO’s most recent economic forecast, account for 
administrative actions taken and regulations issued 
through March 2014, and incorporate new data and 
various modeling updates.1 
Relative to their previous projections, CBO and JCT now 
estimate that the ACA’s coverage provisions will result in 
lower net costs to the federal government: The agencies 
now project a net cost of $36 billion for 2014, $5 billion 
less than the previous projection for the year; and 
$1,383 billion for the 2015–2024 period, $104 billion 
less than the previous projection.2 
The estimated net costs for 2014 stem almost entirely 
from spending for subsidies that are to be provided 
through insurance exchanges (often called marketplaces) 
and from an increase in spending for Medicaid (see 
Table 1). For the 2015–2024 period, the projected net 
costs consist of the following:
 Gross costs of $1,839 billion for subsidies and related 
spending for insurance obtained through the 
exchanges, Medicaid, the Children’s Health Insurance 
Program (CHIP), and tax credits for small employers; 
and
 A partial offset of $456 billion in receipts from penalty 
payments, additional revenues resulting from the 
excise tax on high-premium insurance plans, and the 
effects on income and payroll tax revenues and 
associated outlays arising from projected changes in 
employer coverage.
Those estimates address only the insurance coverage pro-
visions of the ACA, which do not generate all of the act’s 
budgetary effects. Many other provisions, on net, are 
expected to reduce budget deficits. Considering all of 
the provisions—including the coverage provisions— 
CBO and JCT estimated in July 2012 (their most recent 
comprehensive estimate) that the ACA’s overall effect 
would be to reduce federal deficits.3 
1. For CBO’s latest baseline projections, see Congressional Budget 
Office, Updated Budget Projections: 2014 to 2024 (April 2014), 
www.cbo.gov/publication/45229.
2. For CBO and JCT’s previous projections of the effects of the 
ACA’s insurance coverage provisions, see Congressional Budget 
Office, The Budget and Economic Outlook: 2014 to 2024, 
Appendix B (February 2014), www.cbo.gov/publication/45010. 
3. See Congressional Budget Office, letter to the Honorable John 
Boehner providing an estimate for H.R. 6079, the Repeal of 
Obamacare Act (July 24, 2012), www.cbo.gov/publication/
43471. CBO and JCT can no longer determine exactly how the 
provisions of the ACA that are not related to the expansion of 
health insurance coverage have affected their projections of direct 
spending and revenues. The provisions that expand insurance 
coverage established entirely new programs or components of 
programs that can be isolated and reassessed. In contrast, other 
provisions of the ACA significantly modified existing federal 
programs and made changes to the Internal Revenue Code. 
Isolating the incremental effects of those provisions on previously 
existing programs and revenues four years after enactment of the 
ACA is not possible.
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Table 1.
Effects on the Deficit of the Insurance Coverage Provisions of the Affordable Care Act 
(Billions of dollars, by fiscal year)
Sources: Congressional Budget Office; staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation. 
Notes: These numbers exclude effects on the deficit of provisions of the Affordable Care Act that are not related to insurance coverage. 
They also exclude federal administrative costs subject to appropriation. (CBO has previously estimated that the Internal Revenue 
Service would need to spend between $5 billion and $10 billion over the 2010–2019 period to implement the Affordable Care Act and 
that the Department of Health and Human Services and other federal agencies would also need to spend $5 billion to $10 billion over 
that period.) In addition, the Affordable Care Act included explicit authorizations for spending on a variety of grant and other 
programs; that funding is also subject to future appropriation action.
Unless otherwise noted, positive numbers indicate an increase in the deficit, and negative numbers indicate a decrease in the deficit.
CHIP = Children’s Health Insurance Program; * = between zero and -$500 million.
a. Includes spending for exchange grants to states and net collections and payments for risk adjustment, reinsurance, and risk corridors.
b. Under current law, states have the flexibility to make programmatic and other budgetary changes to Medicaid and CHIP. CBO estimates 
that state spending on Medicaid and CHIP over the 2015–2024 period will be about $46 billion higher because of the coverage provisions 
of the Affordable Care Act than it would be otherwise.
c. These effects on the deficit include the associated effects of changes in taxable compensation on revenues.
d. Consists mainly of the effects of changes in taxable compensation on revenues. CBO estimates that outlays for Social Security benefits will 
increase by about $7 billion over the 2015–2024 period and that the coverage provisions will have negligible effects on outlays for other 
federal programs.
e. Positive numbers indicate an increase in revenues, and negative numbers indicate a decrease in revenues.
CBO and JCT have updated their baseline estimates of 
the budgetary effects of the ACA’s insurance coverage 
provisions many times since that legislation was enacted 
in March 2010. As time has passed, the period spanned 
by the estimates has changed. But a year-by-year compar-
ison shows that CBO and JCT’s estimates of the net bud-
getary impact of the ACA’s insurance coverage provisions 
have decreased, on balance, over the past four years.
This report describes the insurance coverage provisions of 
the ACA and CBO and JCT’s current estimates of the 
budgetary effects of those provisions. That discussion is 
followed by an explanation of how and why those esti-
mates differ from the interim estimates in CBO’s Febru-
ary 2014 baseline. The report concludes with a discussion 
of the ways in which current estimates of the ACA’s cov-
erage provisions differ from those made when the law was 
enacted in March 2010.
Total,
2015-
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2024
Exchange Subsidies and Related Spendinga 17 36 77 94 101 107 112 119 125 129 132 1,032
Medicaid and CHIP Outlaysb 20 42 62 70 77 82 84 87 91 96 101 792
Small-Employer Tax Creditsc 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 15___ ___ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ _____
Gross Cost of Coverage Provisions 38 80 141 164 180 190 197 208 218 227 235 1,839
Penalty Payments by Uninsured People * -2 -4 -4 -4 -5 -5 -5 -5 -6 -6 -46
Penalty Payments by Employersc 0 0 -8 -12 -13 -15 -16 -17 -18 -20 -21 -139
Excise Tax on High-Premium Insurance Plansc 0 0 0 0 -5 -10 -13 -16 -20 -25 -30 -120
Other Effects on Revenues and Outlaysd -2 -3 -6 -11 -14 -16 -18 -20 -21 -21 -22 -152___ ___ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ _____
Net Cost of Coverage Provisions 36 74 123 138 143 144 146 150 153 155 156 1,383
Memorandum:
Changes in Mandatory Spending 35 92 147 173 181 192 200 211 221 230 238 1,885
Changes in Revenuese -1 18 24 35 37 48 54 61 68 75 83 503
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The Insurance Coverage Provisions 
and Their Effects on the Number of 
People With and Without Insurance
Among the key elements of the ACA’s insurance coverage 
provisions that are encompassed by the estimates discussed 
here are the following:
 The ACA allows many individuals and families to 
purchase subsidized insurance through the exchanges 
(or marketplaces) operated either by the federal 
government or by a state government.
 States are permitted but not required to expand 
eligibility for Medicaid. 
 Most legal residents of the United States must either 
obtain health insurance or pay a penalty for not doing 
so (under a provision known as the individual 
mandate).
 Certain employers that decline to offer their 
employees health insurance coverage that meets 
specified standards will be assessed penalties.
 A federal excise tax will be imposed on some health 
insurance plans with high premiums. 
 Most insurers offering policies either for purchase 
through the exchanges or directly to consumers 
outside of the exchanges must meet several 
requirements: For example, they must accept all 
applicants regardless of health status; they may vary 
premiums only by age, smoking status, and 
geographic location; and they may not limit coverage 
for preexisting medical conditions.4
 Certain small employers that provide health insurance 
to their employees will be eligible to receive a tax 
credit of up to 50 percent of the cost of that insurance.
The ACA also made other changes to rules governing 
health insurance coverage that are not listed here. Those 
other provisions address coverage in the nongroup, small-
group, and large-group markets, in some cases including 
self-insured employment-based plans. 
CBO and JCT estimate that the insurance coverage pro-
visions of the ACA will increase the proportion of the 
nonelderly population with insurance from roughly 
80 percent in the absence of the ACA to about 84 percent 
in 2014 and to about 89 percent in 2016 and beyond (see 
Table 2). CBO and JCT project that 12 million more 
nonelderly people will have health insurance in 2014 
than would have had it in the absence of the ACA. They 
also project that 19 million more people will be insured 
in 2015, 25 million more will be insured in 2016, and 
26 million more will be insured each year from 2017 
through 2024 than would have been the case without the 
ACA. 
Those gains in coverage will be the net result of many 
changes in insurance coverage relative to what would 
have occurred in the absence of the ACA. In 2018 and 
later years, 25 million people are projected to have cover-
age through the exchanges, and 13 million more, on net, 
are projected to have coverage through Medicaid and 
CHIP than would have had it in the absence of the ACA. 
Partly offsetting those increases, however, are projected 
net decreases in employment-based coverage and in cov-
erage in the nongroup market outside the exchanges. 
The estimated increase in insurance coverage in 2014 
represents the number of people who are expected to be 
insured this year under current law minus the number 
who would have been insured this year in the absence of 
the ACA. That number may differ from the number 
of people who are expected to be insured this year minus 
the number who were insured last year, because people 
move in and out of insurance coverage over time as a 
result of changes in employment, family circumstances, 
and other factors. In particular, some people who had 
insurance coverage in 2013 and would have become 
uninsured in 2014 for one reason or another in the 
absence of the ACA will, under the ACA, be covered in 
2014 through the exchanges, Medicaid, or CHIP. Those 
people are included in CBO and JCT’s estimate of the 
increase in insurance coverage in 2014 that stems from 
the ACA.5 CBO and JCT have not estimated the number 
of people who were uninsured in 2013 and will be 
insured in 2014.
4. Premiums charged for adults 21 or older may not vary according 
to age by a ratio of more than 3:1. 
5. Correspondingly, people who were uninsured in 2013 but would 
have obtained insurance in 2014 in the absence of the ACA are 
not counted as part of the increase in insurance coverage resulting 
from the ACA.
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Table 2.
Effects of the Affordable Care Act on Health Insurance Coverage
(Millions of nonelderly people, by calendar year)
Sources: Congressional Budget Office; staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation. 
Notes: Figures for the nonelderly population include residents of the 50 states and the District of Columbia who are younger than 65. 
ACA = Affordable Care Act; CHIP = Children’s Health Insurance Program; * = between -500,000 and zero; 
** = between zero and 500,000.
a. Figures reflect average enrollment over the course of a year and include spouses and dependents covered under family policies; people 
reporting multiple sources of coverage are assigned a primary source.
b. “Other” includes Medicare; the changes under the ACA are almost entirely for nongroup coverage. 
c. The uninsured population includes people who will be unauthorized immigrants and thus ineligible either for exchange subsidies or for 
most Medicaid benefits; people who will be ineligible for Medicaid because they live in a state that has chosen not to expand coverage; 
people who will be eligible for Medicaid but will choose not to enroll; and people who will not purchase insurance to which they have 
access through an employer, an exchange, or directly from an insurer. 
d. The change in employment-based coverage is the net result of projected increases and decreases in offers of health insurance from 
employers and changes in enrollment by workers and their families.
e. Workers who would have to pay more than a specified share of their income (9.5 percent in 2014) for employment-based coverage could 
receive subsidies through an exchange. 
f. Excludes coverage purchased directly from insurers outside of an exchange. 
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024
Insurance Coverage Without the ACAa
Medicaid and CHIP 35 35 34 33 33 34 34 34 35 35 35
Employment-based coverage 156 158 160 163 164 165 165 165 166 166 166
Nongroup and other coverageb 24 24 25 25 26 26 26 26 27 27 27
Uninsuredc 54 55 55 55 55 56 56 56 57 57 57___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___
Total 270 272 274 277 278 280 281 282 283 284 285
Change in Insurance Coverage Under the ACA
Insurance exchanges 6 13 24 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25
Medicaid and CHIP 7 11 12 12 13 13 13 13 13 13 13
Employment-based coveraged * -2 -7 -7 -8 -8 -8 -8 -8 -7 -7
Nongroup and other coverageb -1 -3 -4 -4 -4 -4 -4 -4 -4 -5 -5
Uninsuredc -12 -19 -25 -26 -26 -26 -26 -26 -26 -26 -26
Uninsured Under the ACA
Number of uninsured nonelderly
peoplec 42 36 30 30 29 30 30 30 31 31 31
Insured as a percentage of the 
nonelderly population
Including all U.S. residents 84 87 89 89 89 89 89 89 89 89 89
Excluding unauthorized immigrants 86 89 91 92 92 92 92 92 92 92 92
Memorandum: 
Exchange Enrollees and Subsidies
Number with unaffordable offer from 
employere ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** **
Number of unsubsidized exchange 
enrollees (Millions of people)f 1 3 5 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
Average exchange subsidy per 
subsidized enrollee (Dollars) 4,410 4,250 4,830 4,930 5,300 5,570 5,880 6,220 6,580 6,890 7,170
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Figure 1.
Effects of the Affordable Care Act on Health Insurance Coverage, 2024
(Millions of nonelderly people)
Sources: Congressional Budget Office; staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation.
Notes: The nonelderly population consists of residents of the 50 states and the District of Columbia who are younger than 65.
ACA = Affordable Care Act; CHIP = Children’s Health Insurance Program.
a. “Other” includes Medicare; the changes under the ACA are almost entirely for nongroup coverage.
b. The uninsured population includes people who will be unauthorized immigrants and thus ineligible either for exchange subsidies or for 
most Medicaid benefits; people who will be ineligible for Medicaid because they live in a state that has chosen not to expand coverage; 
people who will be eligible for Medicaid but will choose not to enroll; and people who will not purchase insurance to which they have 
access through an employer, an exchange, or directly from an insurer. 
Despite the substantial projected increases in insurance 
coverage under the ACA, CBO and JCT estimate that in 
2024, 31 million people, or roughly one in nine non-
elderly U.S. residents, will be without health insurance 
(see Figure 1). In that year, about 30 percent of those 
uninsured people are expected to be unauthorized immi-
grants and thus ineligible either for exchange subsidies or 
for most Medicaid benefits; about 5 percent will be 
ineligible for Medicaid because they live in a state that has 
chosen not to expand coverage; about 20 percent will be 
eligible for Medicaid but will choose not to enroll; and 
the remaining 45 percent will not purchase insurance to 
which they have access through an employer, an 
exchange, or directly from an insurer. 
Estimated Effects on Sources of 
Insurance Coverage and the 
Federal Budget 
Most of the budgetary effects of the ACA’s coverage 
provisions will stem from the subsidies for insurance 
purchased through the exchanges and from increased 
costs for Medicaid. That additional spending will be par-
tially offset by penalty payments made by individuals 
and employers, by additional revenues resulting from 
the excise tax on high-premium insurance plans, and 
by the effects on income and payroll tax revenues 
and associated outlays stemming from a reduction in 
employment-based insurance coverage. 
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Coverage Through the Exchanges and 
Premiums and Subsidies for Such Coverage
Subsidies and related spending for insurance obtained 
through the exchanges constitute the largest share of the 
costs of the ACA’s coverage provisions. 
Coverage Through the Exchanges. CBO and JCT esti-
mate that, over the course of calendar year 2014, an 
average of 6 million people will be covered by insurance 
obtained through the exchanges. The total number who 
will have such coverage at some points during the year 
is expected to be more than the average because some 
people will be covered for only part of the year. 
Coverage through the exchanges will vary over the course 
of 2014 not only because of the increase during open 
enrollment in the first few months of the year but also 
because people who experience qualifying life events, 
such as the loss of employment-based insurance or the 
birth of a child, will be allowed to purchase coverage later 
in the year, and because some people will drop their 
exchange-based coverage as they become eligible for 
employment-based insurance. The estimate of 6 million 
people does not include people who enrolled through the 
exchanges but failed to pay their initial premiums, 
because they will not be covered; it also does not include 
people in any part of the year for which they lose coverage 
because of nonpayment of premiums. 
Thus, CBO and JCT’s estimate of 6 million people 
receiving such coverage in 2014 cannot be compared 
directly with the number of people who have enrolled 
through the exchanges as of any given date.6 The number 
of people who will have coverage through the exchanges 
in 2014 will not be known precisely until after the year 
has ended. 
CBO and JCT anticipate that coverage through the 
exchanges will increase substantially over time as more 
people respond to subsidies and to penalties for failure to 
obtain coverage. Coverage through the exchanges is pro-
jected to increase to an average of 13 million people in 
2015, 24 million in 2016, and 25 million in each year 
between 2017 and 2024. Roughly three-quarters of those 
enrollees are expected to receive exchange subsidies. 
Premiums for Exchange Coverage. CBO and JCT 
estimate that the average cost of individual policies for 
the second-lowest-cost “silver” plan in the exchanges—
the benchmark for determining exchange subsidies—is 
about $3,800 in 2014.7 That estimate represents a 
national average, and it reflects CBO and JCT’s projec-
tions of the age, sex, health status, and geographic 
distribution of those who will obtain coverage through 
the exchanges in 2014. That benchmark premium is 
projected to rise slightly in 2015, to about $3,900, and 
then to rise more rapidly thereafter, reaching about 
$4,400 in 2016 and about $6,900 in 2024.8 Thus, pre-
miums are projected to increase by about 6 percent per 
year, on average, from 2016 to 2024. The current projec-
tion of the average premium for the benchmark silver 
plan in 2016 of about $4,400 is 15 percent below the 
comparable estimate of $5,200 published by CBO in 
November 2009.9
CBO and JCT anticipate that rising health care costs per 
person will continue to be the primary factor raising 
health insurance premiums over the next decade. Project-
ing the growth in health care spending per person always 
involves uncertainty, however, and it is particularly chal-
lenging in light of the recent slowdown in that growth 
that has been experienced by private insurers, as well as 
by the Medicare and Medicaid programs. Moreover, 
6. See, for example, Department of Health and Human Services, 
Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, 
Health Insurance Marketplace: March Enrollment Report for the 
Period: October 1, 2013–March 1, 2014, ASPE Issue Brief 
(March 2014), http://go.usa.gov/Ksc4.
7. The size of the tax credit (or premium subsidy) that someone will 
receive will be based in part on the premium of the second-lowest-
cost silver plan (which covers about 70 percent of the costs of 
covered benefits) offered through the exchange in which that 
person participates.
8. The average premium for all plans purchased through the 
exchanges will differ from the average for the benchmark plans 
because people can purchase plans with higher or lower actuarial 
value than the benchmark and with premiums that are more or 
less expensive than those for the second-lowest-cost silver plan.
9. See Congressional Budget Office, letter to the Honorable Evan 
Bayh providing an analysis of health insurance premiums under 
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (November 30, 
2009), www.cbo.gov/publication/41792. Similarly, the current 
projection of the average premium for a self-only policy in the 
employment-based market in 2016 of about $6,400 is 14 percent 
below the comparable estimate of $7,400 published by CBO in 
November 2009. See Congressional Budget Office, Selected CBO 
Publications Related to Health Care Legislation, 2009–2010 
(December 2010), p. 222, www.cbo.gov/publication/21993.
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views differ on how much of the slowdown is attributable 
to the recession and its aftermath and how much to other 
factors. Exchange premiums will be affected not only 
by underlying growth in health care costs but also by 
changes in the average health status of enrollees, changes 
in federal programs that spread risk, and changes in plan 
characteristics. Those three factors are discussed in more 
detail below. 
Effects of the Health Status of Exchange Enrollees. The pre-
miums for policies sold in the exchanges will be influ-
enced by the expected health status of enrollees in the 
exchanges, and CBO and JCT anticipate that exchange 
enrollees in the future will be healthier, on average, than 
the smaller number of people who are obtaining such 
coverage in 2014. Such an outcome would be expected if 
people who are less healthy are more eager to obtain 
insurance, and it would be consistent with enrollment 
and medical claims in Massachusetts after that state intro-
duced subsidized exchanges in 2006.10 That factor is 
expected to lower premiums in 2015 relative to those in 
2014.
CBO and JCT do not expect any further significant shifts 
in the average health status of exchange enrollees after 
2015 under current law. As a result, that factor is not 
expected to raise or lower premiums after 2015.
Actual exchange premiums for 2015 may differ from 
those CBO and JCT have projected because insurers 
could have different expectations of their costs for that 
year. For example, if enrollees in exchange plans in 2014 
are significantly less healthy than insurers had expected, 
and their care therefore is significantly more costly, insur-
ers could project notably higher costs in 2015 and charge 
correspondingly higher premiums in 2015 than in 2014. 
However, anecdotal reports to date have been mixed and 
provide no clear evidence that insurers have been substan-
tially surprised by the health status of their enrollees. 
Moreover, CBO and JCT’s projections are national aver-
ages, and premiums in some places in the country will 
probably be much higher or lower in 2015 than CBO 
and JCT have projected for the nation as a whole.
Effects of the Reinsurance Program. The premiums for 
policies sold in the exchanges also are affected by the 
reinsurance payments that the government will make to 
plans whose enrollees incur particularly high costs for 
medical care—that is, costs that are above a specified 
threshold and up to a certain maximum. The reinsurance 
program applies to all nongroup insurance that complies 
with the ACA’s market and benefit standards and that is 
issued from 2014 through 2016, either within or outside 
of the exchanges. (For more information on the ACA’s 
provisions governing the nongroup market, see Box 1.) 
Under the reinsurance program, CBO and JCT project, 
the government will collect $10 billion in 2015, $6 bil-
lion in 2016, and $4 billion in 2017 (for insurance 
issued in 2014, 2015, and 2016) through a per-enrollee 
assessment on most private insurance plans, including 
self-insured plans and plans that are offered in the large-
group market.11 CBO and JCT expect that reinsurance 
payments scheduled for insurance provided in 2014 are 
large enough to have reduced exchange premiums this 
year by approximately 10 percent relative to what they 
would have been without the program. However, such 
payments will be significantly smaller for 2015 and 2016, 
and they will not occur for the years following. Therefore, 
that program is expected to have resulted in lower premi-
ums in 2014, to reduce premiums by smaller amounts 
in 2015 and 2016 than in 2014, and to have no direct 
effect thereafter.
Effects of the Characteristics of Exchange Plans. The plans 
being offered through exchanges in 2014 appear to have, 
in general, lower payment rates for providers, narrower 
networks of providers, and tighter management of their 
subscribers’ use of health care than employment-based 
plans do.12 Those features allow insurers that offer plans 
through the exchanges to charge lower premiums 
(although they also make plans somewhat less attractive 
10. See Amitabh Chandra, Jonathan Gruber, and Robin McKnight, 
“The Importance of the Individual Mandate—Evidence From 
Massachusetts,” New England Journal of Medicine (January 2011), 
vol. 364, no. 4, pp. 293–295, http://tinyurl.com/496lfct. CBO 
analyzed unpublished data provided by the authors of that article.
11. Under reinsurance, an additional $5 billion will be collected 
from health insurance plans and deposited into the general fund 
of the U.S. Treasury. That amount is the same as the amount 
appropriated for the Early Retiree Reinsurance Program (which 
was in operation before 2014) and is not included here as part of 
the budgetary effects of the ACA’s insurance coverage provisions.
12. See McKinsey & Company, Exchanges Go Live: Early Trends in 
Exchange Dynamics (October 2013), http://tinyurl.com/qd3kqfl, 
and Emerging Exchange Dynamics: Temporary Turbulence or 
Sustainable Market Disruption? (September 2013), 
http://tinyurl.com/og3tu9d.
8 UPDATED ESTIMATES OF THE EFFECTS OF THE INSURANCE COVERAGE PROVISIONS OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT, APRIL 2014 APRIL 2014
CBO
Continued
to potential enrollees). As projected enrollment in 
exchange plans grows from an average of 6 million in 
2014 to 24 million in 2016, CBO and JCT anticipate 
that many plans will not be able to sustain provider pay-
ment rates that are as low or networks that are as narrow 
as they appear to be in 2014. CBO and JCT expect that 
exchange plans will still have lower provider payment 
rates, more limited provider networks, and stricter man-
agement of care, on average, than employment-based 
plans but that the differences between employment-
based plans and exchange plans will narrow as exchange 
enrollment increases. That pattern will put upward pres-
sure on exchange premiums over the next couple of years, 
although CBO and JCT anticipate that the plans’ 
characteristics will stabilize after 2016.
Subsidies for Exchange Coverage and Related Spending. 
Exchange subsidies depend both on benchmark premi-
ums in the exchanges and on certain characteristics of 
enrollees, such as age, family size, geographic location, 
and income. CBO and JCT project that the average sub-
sidy will be $4,410 in 2014, that it will decline to $4,250 
in 2015, and that it will then rise each year to reach 
$7,170 in 2024 (see Table 2 on page 4).13 The projected 
decrease from 2014 to 2015 stems from the small 
projected increase in premiums in 2015 and a shift in the 
income of people who are projected to enroll in the
Box 1.
Nongroup Health Plans Under the Affordable Care Act
Starting in 2014, companies that sell nongroup 
insurance plans, whether through the exchanges or 
not, must—in most cases—follow certain rules speci-
fied in the Affordable Care Act (ACA).1 All new 
plans, for example, must cover a set of essential health 
benefits, and their premiums may not vary among 
enrollees on the basis of health. Insurers selling non-
group plans through the exchanges must offer at least 
one “silver” plan (with an actuarial value of 70 per-
cent) and one “gold” plan (80 percent).2 Insurers 
selling plans outside of the exchanges must follow the 
same system of “metal” tiers, ranging from 60 percent 
(“bronze”) to 90 percent (“platinum”), but, unlike 
insurers in the exchanges, they are exempt from the 
requirement to offer at least one silver and one gold 
plan.3 Plans must be available for anyone to purchase 
during specified annual open-enrollment periods 
and, outside of those periods, to anyone who experi-
ences a qualifying life event, such as the birth of a 
child or a change in employment. States may impose 
additional requirements on insurers that offer non-
group coverage inside or outside of the exchanges.
Because of the uncertainty about average health care 
costs for people enrolling under the new rules governing 
the nongroup market, plans that comply with the ACA’s 
rules are protected from some of the risk that they will 
attract enrollees whose health care costs will prove to be 
especially high.4 The Congressional Budget Office 
(CBO) and the staff of the Joint Committee on 
Taxation (JCT) expect that people who purchase 
ACA-compliant plans outside of the exchanges would 
probably not have been eligible for subsidies had they 
obtained coverage through the exchanges and that many 
would have purchased coverage in the nongroup market 
in the absence of the ACA. 
1. Nongroup plans are those sold to individuals and families 
rather than to employers or groups of people.
2. A plan’s actuarial value is the share of costs for covered 
services that it would pay, on average, with a broadly 
representative group of people enrolled. 
3. People under 30 years of age and those who qualify for 
certain exemptions from the individual mandate penalty also 
may purchase catastrophic coverage inside or outside of the 
exchanges. Such plans incorporate the ACA’s set of essential 
health benefits, but they are not required to meet a minimum 
actuarial value of 60 percent. Catastrophic plans have a high 
deductible that is equal to the plan’s out-of-pocket maximum 
and do not qualify for premium or cost-sharing subsidies, 
even when offered through the exchanges.
4. Among the federal safeguards that reduce the risk are the 
risk adjustment and reinsurance programs (which apply to 
all ACA-compliant nongroup plans), and risk corridors 
(which cover all exchange plans and also include certain 
plans offered outside the exchanges); for more discussion, 
see Congressional Budget Office, The Budget and Economic 
Outlook: 2014 to 2024, Appendix B (February 2014), 
www.cbo.gov/publication/45010. 
13. The average exchange subsidy per subsidized enrollee includes 
premium subsidies and cost-sharing subsidies and thus may 
exceed the average benchmark premium in the exchanges.
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exchanges in 2015 compared with those enrolling in 
2014. The increases after 2015 stem largely from the 
projected increase in premiums. 
CBO and JCT estimate that subsidies provided through 
the exchanges and related spending will total $17 billion 
in 2014. That estimate is uncertain in part because the 
number of people who will have such coverage is not yet 
known and in part because detailed information on the 
demographics and family income of the people who have 
such coverage—and on the subsidies they will receive—is 
not yet available. Over the 10 years from 2015 to 2024, 
exchange subsidies and related spending are projected to 
total $1,032 billion, distributed as follows:
 Outlays of $726 billion and a reduction in revenues 
of $129 billion for premium assistance tax credits 
(to cover a portion of eligible individuals’ and families’ 
health insurance premiums), which sum to 
$855 billion (see Table 3);14 
Box 1. Continued
Nongroup Health Plans Under the Affordable Care Act
Under certain limited circumstances, insurers are 
allowed to continue to sell policies that do not 
comply with the ACA’s rules. Such noncompliant 
policies, for example, might not cover all of the essen-
tial benefits specified in the ACA, might have an 
actuarial value of less than 60 percent, or might 
charge lower premiums for people in better health.5 
Those limited circumstances include the following:
 Some policies can be “grandfathered” in. Policies 
that were in effect in March 2010 and that have 
been maintained continuously without substantial 
changes in benefits or in costs to enrollees are 
exempt from most of the ACA’s rules. 
 Some states permitted insurers to allow enrollees 
to renew policies that did not comply with certain 
market and benefit rules for 2014 so long as the 
policy year began before January 1, 2014.
 Some policies can qualify under what is known as 
transitional relief. In November 2013, the 
Administration announced that states could 
accept renewals of noncompliant policies for a 
policy year starting between January 1, 2014, and 
October 1, 2014. In March 2014, that transitional
5. Insurers may also sell other policies that are service specific 
(including dental and vision), that cover accidental injury 
or specific diseases, or that are in effect for only a short 
time; such plans do not, on their own, count as providing 
minimum essential coverage under the ACA. Such plans are 
not included in CBO and JCT’s estimates of coverage under 
the ACA.
relief was extended for two more years. (More detail 
on recent administrative actions that affect non-
compliant plans is provided in “Availability of 
Noncompliant Plans” in the main text.)
CBO and JCT estimate that relatively few people will 
be enrolled in noncompliant nongroup plans. The 
agencies project that, under the ACA, in 2014 about 
2 million people will purchase noncompliant plans; 
they anticipate that enrollment in such plans will 
decline to negligible numbers by 2016. They also 
project that enrollment in nongroup plans through 
the exchanges will average 6 million people in 2014, 
13 million in 2015, and 24 million or 25 million 
each year thereafter, and that roughly 5 million peo-
ple will enroll in ACA-compliant plans outside of the 
exchanges each year from 2014 through 2024. That 
last estimate is especially uncertain because informa-
tion on the number of people who have purchased 
coverage in the nongroup market in past years is 
incomplete and varies widely by data source. 
In the absence of the ACA, 9 million to 10 million 
people would have enrolled in nongroup coverage 
each year from 2014 through 2024, CBO and JCT 
estimate. With roughly 5 million people expected to 
enroll in nongroup plans in years after 2015 under the 
ACA (excluding those people who purchase policies 
through the exchanges), that number will be 4 million 
to 5 million lower under the ACA than the number 
projected in the absence of the law (see the change in 
coverage labeled “Nongroup and other coverage” 
in Table 2 of the main text).
14. The subsidies for health insurance premiums are structured as 
refundable tax credits; following the usual procedures for such 
credits, the portions that exceed taxpayers’ income tax liabilities 
are classified as outlays in CBO’s baseline projections, and the 
portions that reduce tax payments are classified as reductions in 
revenues.
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Table 3.
Enrollment in, and Budgetary Effects of, Health Insurance Exchanges
Sources: Congressional Budget Office; staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation. 
Note: n.a. = not applicable; * = between zero and $500 million.
a. Figures reflect average enrollment over the course of a year and include spouses and dependents covered under family policies. Figures 
for the nonelderly population include residents of the 50 states and the District of Columbia who are younger than 65.
b. Excludes coverage purchased directly from insurers outside of an exchange. 
Total,
2015-
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2024
Individually Purchased Coverage
Subsidized 5 10 19 19 20 19 19 19 19 19 19 n.a.
Unsubsidizedb 1 3 5 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 n.a.__ __ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___
Total 6 13 24 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 n.a.
Employment-Based Coverage
Purchased Through Exchangesb 2 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 n.a.
Changes in Mandatory Spending
Outlays for premium credits 10 23 51 65 71 75 79 84 89 93 95 726
Cost-sharing subsidies 3 7 13 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 22 175
Exchange grants to states 2 2 1 * * 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
Payments for risk adjustment, 
reinsurance, and risk corridors 0 18 19 22 15 17 18 19 19 20 19 186___ ___ ___ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ______
Total 15 50 84 104 103 109 116 123 129 134 137 1,089
Changes in Revenues
Reductions in revenues from
premium credits -2 -5 -10 -12 -13 -14 -14 -15 -15 -15 -15 -129
Collections for risk adjustment,
reinsurance, and risk corridors 0 19 18 22 15 17 18 19 19 20 19 186___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ____
Total -2 14 7 10 2 3 4 4 4 5 5 56
Net Increase in the Deficit From Exchange
Subsidies and Related Spending 17 36 77 94 101 107 112 119 125 129 132 1,032
Memorandum:
Total Subsidies Through Premium Credits
(Billions of dollars, by fiscal year) 12 29 62 78 84 89 93 99 104 108 110 855
Total Exchange Subsidies (Billions of
dollars, by calendar year) 21 42 89 95 104 108 114 121 127 130 133 1,064
Average Exchange Subsidy per Subsidized
Enrollee (Dollars, by calendar year) 4,410 4,250 4,830 4,930 5,300 5,570 5,880 6,220 6,580 6,890 7,170 n.a.
(Millions of nonelderly people, by calendar year)a
Budgetary Effects
(Billions of dollars, by fiscal year)
Exchange Enrollment
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 Outlays of $175 billion for cost-sharing subsidies (to 
reduce out-of-pocket payments for low-income 
enrollees);
 Outlays of $2 billion for grants to states for operating 
exchanges; and 
 Outlays and revenues each totaling $186 billion 
related to payments and collections for risk 
adjustment, reinsurance, and risk corridors (having no 
net budgetary effect). 
The ACA’s provisions for risk adjustment, reinsurance, 
and risk corridors generate payments by the federal 
government to insurers and collections by the federal gov-
ernment from insurers that reflect differences in health 
status and costs among insurers’ enrollees.15 CBO treats 
the payments as outlays and the collections as revenues 
and projects that, over the 2015–2024 period, risk 
adjustment payments and collections will total $156 bil-
lion each and reinsurance payments and collections will 
total $20 billion each. Over that same period, CBO 
estimates, risk corridor payments from the federal gov-
ernment to health insurers will total $9 billion and the 
corresponding collections from insurers will amount to 
$9 billion, thus having no net budgetary effect. (The 
section below, “Changes From Previous Estimates,” dis-
cusses the changes in those figures from the previous 
projection and the reasons for the changes.)
Enrollment in Medicaid and CHIP and the 
Federal Cost of Such Coverage
CBO and JCT project that substantially more people will 
be enrolled in Medicaid and CHIP than would have been 
the case in the absence of the ACA—7 million more in 
calendar year 2014, 11 million more in 2015, and 
12 million to 13 million more people in each year 
between 2016 and 2024 (see Table 2 on page 4).16 Some 
of those additional enrollees will be people who become 
eligible for Medicaid because of the ACA’s coverage 
expansion; others will be people who would have been 
eligible for Medicaid or CHIP in the absence of the ACA 
but would not have enrolled. CBO expects that the 
ACA’s individual mandate, increased outreach, and new 
opportunities to enroll in those programs through 
exchanges will increase enrollment among people who 
were previously eligible. 
The anticipated increase in Medicaid enrollment after 
2014 reflects the expectation that more people in states 
that have already expanded Medicaid eligibility will enroll 
in the program and that more states will expand Medic-
aid eligibility. Those increases will be partially offset by 
lower enrollment in CHIP, starting in 2016; in CBO’s 
baseline, funding projected for that program is lower in 
2016 and following years than is anticipated for the next 
two years.17 
As with exchange enrollment, the projected figures repre-
sent averages over the course of those years and differ 
from estimates of enrollment at any particular point dur-
ing a year. CBO and JCT expect that, once the ACA is 
fully phased in, enrollment in Medicaid and CHIP will 
vary over the course of each year. Unlike exchange plans, 
which offer limited annual open-enrollment periods, 
Medicaid and CHIP are open to eligible people at any 
time. As a result, people move in and out of coverage for 
many reasons, including a change in their need for health 
care; a change in their awareness of the availability of cov-
erage; or a change in circumstances that affects program 
eligibility, such as a change in income or the birth of a 
15. For more details, see Congressional Budget Office, The Budget 
and Economic Outlook: 2014 to 2024, Appendix B 
(February 2014), www.cbo.gov/publication/45010.
16. Early in April 2014, the Department of Health and Human 
Services issued the fifth in a series of monthly reports on state 
Medicaid and CHIP enrollment, providing a preliminary estimate 
of 3 million additional Medicaid and CHIP enrollees at the end of 
February in 46 states (compared with enrollment in the months 
before the ACA’s coverage expansions began). That number is 
noted to include people who were newly eligible for Medicaid 
because of the ACA’s coverage expansion as well as those who were 
eligible for Medicaid and CHIP in the absence of the ACA but 
would not have signed up, and those who were re-enrolling. It does 
not, however, include new enrollees who applied for Medicaid 
through federally facilitated marketplaces. See Centers for 
Medicare & Medicaid Services, Medicaid & CHIP: February 2014 
Monthly Applications, Eligibility Determinations, and Enrollment 
Report (April 4, 2014), http://go.usa.gov/k2az (PDF, 688 KB). 
17. Annual spending for CHIP is projected to reach $12.5 billion in 
2015—the final year in which the program is fully funded under 
current law. Under the rules governing baseline projections for 
expiring programs, CBO projects funding for CHIP after 2015 at 
an annualized amount of about $6 billion. For more details about 
the CHIP baseline, see Congressional Budget Office, “Children’s 
Health Insurance Program Spending and Enrollment Detail for 
CBO’s April 2014 Baseline,” www.cbo.gov/publication/45229.
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child. Therefore, the number of people who receive cov-
erage through Medicaid and CHIP in any year will not 
generally be known precisely until well after the year has 
ended and state enrollment data have become available.
Furthermore, it will never be possible to determine how 
many people who sign up for Medicaid would have been 
eligible but not enrolled in the absence of the ACA. 
The number of people who sign up who are newly eligi-
ble can be determined because states that expand coverage 
under the act will report the number of enrollees who 
became eligible as a result of that expansion in order to 
receive the additional federal funding that will be pro-
vided for such enrollees. But there will be no way to tell 
whether people who sign up who would have been eligi-
ble without the ACA would, or would not, have enrolled 
anyway. 
CBO and JCT estimate that the added costs to the fed-
eral government for Medicaid and CHIP attributable 
to the ACA will be $20 billion in 2014 and will total 
$792 billion for the 2015–2024 period (see Table 1 on 
page 2).
The extent of the expansion of insurance coverage 
through all sources in 2014 as a result of the ACA will 
not be clear until more time has elapsed and more data 
are available. The government is collecting data on the 
number of people who sign up for coverage in the 
exchanges, Medicaid, and CHIP; moreover, the ACA 
requires additional information on coverage to be 
reported by employers and health insurance providers. In 
addition, CBO and JCT monitor various sources of sur-
vey data—including large, federally sponsored surveys of 
households and employers as well as smaller, privately 
funded surveys that use telephone and online question-
naires.18 However, some data will be available only after a 
delay—anywhere from a few months to a few years. 
Moreover, differences must be reconciled within and 
among data sets to arrive at a clear picture of changes 
in overall insurance coverage and the sources of such 
coverage.
Tax Credits for Small Employers
Under the ACA, certain small employers are eligible to 
receive tax credits to defray the cost of providing health 
insurance to their employees. CBO and JCT project 
that those tax credits will total $1 billion in 2014 and 
$15 billion over the 2015–2024 period. 
Penalty Payments by Uninsured People 
Beginning in 2014, the ACA requires most legal residents 
of the United States to obtain health insurance or pay a 
penalty. People who do not obtain coverage will pay the 
greater of two amounts: either a flat dollar penalty per 
adult in a family, rising from $95 in 2014 to $695 in 
2016 and indexed to inflation thereafter (the penalty for a 
child is half the amount, and an overall cap will apply to 
family payments); or a percentage of a household’s 
adjusted gross income in excess of the income threshold 
for mandatory tax-filing—a share that will rise from 
1.0 percent in 2014 to 2.5 percent in 2016 and subse-
quent years (also subject to a cap). CBO and JCT 
estimate that such payments from individuals will total 
$46 billion over the 2015–2024 period.
Some people, such as unauthorized immigrants, are not 
subject to the requirement to obtain health insurance. 
Other people face the requirement but are exempt from 
the penalty, for example, because their income is low 
enough that they do not file income tax returns, their 
income is below 138 percent of federal poverty guidelines 
and they are ineligible for Medicaid because their state 
did not expand the program, they are members of an 
Indian tribe, or their premiums would exceed a specified 
share of their income (8 percent in 2014 and indexed for 
inflation over time). Certain other exemptions are 
described below in the section “Regulations and Other 
Administrative Actions.” 
Penalty Payments by Employers 
Beginning in 2015, certain large employers who do not 
offer health insurance that meets specified standards will 
pay a penalty if they have full-time employees who 
receive a subsidy through an exchange. The specified 
standards involve affordability and the share of the cost of 
covered benefits paid by the insurance plan.19 Employers 
with at least 50 full-time-equivalent (FTE) employees 
will generally be subject to that requirement. In 2015 
18. Among the sources that CBO and JCT will consult in their 
analyses of the ACA’s effects are the Department of Health and 
Human Services’ National Health Interview Survey, results from 
Gallup polls, the Urban Institute’s Health Reform Monitoring 
Survey, and RAND’s American Life Panel Survey. Also, more 
detailed information on changes in coverage by family income will 
come later from the Census Bureau’s Current Population Survey 
and the Department of Health and Human Services’ Medical 
Expenditure Panel Survey. 
19. To meet the standards, the cost to the employee for self-only 
coverage must not exceed a specified share of income (9.5 percent 
in 2014 and indexed over time), and the plan must pay at least 
60 percent of the cost of covered benefits.
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only, however, employers with at least 50 but fewer than 
100 FTE employees will be exempt from the requirement 
if they certify that they have not made certain reductions 
to health insurance coverage or reduced their number of 
FTE employees to avoid the penalties. (Recent changes to 
this aspect of the ACA are discussed below in “Employers’ 
Responsibilities in 2015.”) CBO and JCT estimate that 
penalty payments by employers will total $139 billion 
over the 2015–2024 period. 
Excise Tax on High-Premium Insurance Plans
According to CBO and JCT’s estimates, federal revenues 
will increase by $120 billion over the 2015–2024 period 
because of the excise tax on high-premium insurance 
plans. Roughly one-quarter of that increase stems from 
excise tax receipts, and roughly three-quarters is from the 
effects on revenues of changes in employees’ taxable com-
pensation and, to a lesser extent, in employers’ deductible 
expenses. In particular, CBO and JCT anticipate that 
many employers and workers will shift to health plans 
with premiums that are below the specified thresholds to 
avoid paying the tax, resulting generally in higher taxable 
wages for affected workers. 
Other Effects on Revenues and Outlays
The ACA also will affect federal tax revenues because 
fewer people will have employment-based health insur-
ance and thus more of their income will take the form of 
taxable wages. CBO and JCT project that, as a result of 
the ACA, between 7 million and 8 million fewer people 
will have employment-based insurance each year from 
2016 through 2024 than would have been the case in the 
absence of the ACA. That difference is the net result of 
projected increases and decreases in offers of health insur-
ance from employers and of choices about enrollment by 
active workers, early retirees (people under the age of 65 
at retirement), and their families. 
In 2019, for example, an estimated 13 million people 
who would have enrolled in employment-based coverage 
in the absence of the ACA will not have an offer of such 
coverage under the ACA; an estimated 3 million people 
who would have enrolled in employment-based coverage 
will have such an offer but will choose not to enroll. 
Some of those 16 million people are expected to gain cov-
erage through some other source; others will forgo health 
insurance. Those decreases in employment-based cover-
age will be partially offset, however. About 8 million 
people who would not have had employment-based cov-
erage in the absence of the ACA are expected to receive 
such coverage under the ACA; they will either take up an 
offer of coverage they would have received anyway or take 
up a new offer. Some of those enrollees would have been 
uninsured in the absence of the ACA.
Because of the net reduction in employment-based cover-
age, the share of workers’ pay that takes the form of 
nontaxable benefits (such as health insurance premiums) 
will be smaller—and the share that takes the form of tax-
able wages will be larger—than would otherwise have 
been the case. That shift in compensation will boost fed-
eral tax receipts. Partially offsetting those added receipts 
will be an estimated $7 billion increase in Social Security 
benefits that will arise from the higher wages paid to 
workers. All told, CBO and JCT project, those effects 
will reduce federal budget deficits by $152 billion over 
the 2015–2024 period.
Changes From Previous Estimates
CBO and JCT currently estimate that the insurance cov-
erage provisions of the ACA will have a smaller budgetary 
cost than those agencies estimated in February 2014.20 
CBO and JCT now estimate that the net cost to the 
federal government of those provisions for fiscal year 
2014 will be $36 billion, $5 billion less than the previous 
estimate of $41 billion, and that the net cost for the 
2015–2024 period will be $1,383 billion, $104 billion 
(or 7 percent) below the previous estimate of 
$1,487 billion (see Table 4). 
CBO and JCT have updated their baseline estimates of 
the budgetary effects of the ACA’s insurance coverage 
provisions many times since that legislation was enacted 
in March 2010. As time has passed, the period spanned 
by the estimates has changed, but a year-by-year compar-
ison shows that CBO and JCT’s estimates of the net 
budgetary impact of the ACA’s insurance coverage provi-
sions have decreased, on balance, over the past four years.
The first part of this section describes the factors that led 
to changes in CBO and JCT’s estimates since February 
2014, the second part summarizes the changes them-
selves, and the third part discusses changes in projected 
budgetary effects since the legislation was enacted in 
March 2010. 
20. See Congressional Budget Office, The Budget and Economic 
Outlook: 2014 to 2024, Appendix B (February 2014), 
www.cbo.gov/publication/45010.
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Table 4.
Comparison of CBO and JCT’s Current and Previous Estimates of the Effects of the 
Insurance Coverage Provisions of the Affordable Care Act
Sources: Congressional Budget Office; staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation. 
Note: ACA = Affordable Care Act; CHIP = Children’s Health Insurance Program; * = between zero and 500,000; 
** = between -$500 million and $500 million.
a. Figures for the nonelderly population include residents of the 50 states and the District of Columbia who are younger than 65. 
b. The change in employment-based coverage is the net result of projected increases and decreases in offers of health insurance from 
employers and changes in enrollment by workers and their families.
c. “Other” includes Medicare; the changes under the ACA are almost entirely for nongroup coverage. 
d. The uninsured population includes people who will be unauthorized immigrants and thus ineligible either for exchange subsidies or for 
most Medicaid benefits; people who will be ineligible for Medicaid because they live in a state that has chosen not to expand coverage; 
people who will be eligible for Medicaid but will choose not to enroll; and people who will not purchase insurance to which they have 
access through an employer, an exchange, or directly from an insurer.
e. Positive numbers indicate an increase in the deficit; negative numbers indicate a decrease in the deficit. They also exclude effects on the 
deficit of other provisions of the ACA that are not related to insurance coverage, and they exclude federal administrative costs subject to 
appropriation.
f. Includes spending for exchange grants to states and net collections and payments for risk adjustment, reinsurance, and risk corridors 
(see “Memorandum”).
g. These effects on the deficit include the associated effects of changes in taxable compensation on revenues.
h. Consists mainly of the effects of changes in taxable compensation on revenues.
i. These effects are included in “Exchange Subsidies and Related Spending.”
Insurance Exchanges 24 25 *
Medicaid and CHIP 13 13 1
Employment-Based Coverageb -7 -7 -1
Nongroup and Other Coveragec -5 -5 *
Uninsuredd -25 -26 -1
Exchange Subsidies and Related Spendingf 1,197 1,032 -164
Medicaid and CHIP Outlays 792 792 **
Small-Employer Tax Creditsg 15 15 **_____ _____ ____
Gross Cost of Coverage Provisions 2,004 1,839 -165
Penalty Payments by Uninsured People -52 -46 6
Penalty Payments by Employersg -151 -139 12
Excise Tax on High-Premium Insurance Plansg -108 -120 -12
Other Effects on Revenues and Outlaysh -206 -152 54______ ______ _____
Net Cost of Coverage Provisions 1,487 1,383 -104
Memorandum:
Net Collections and Payments for Risk Adjustment,
-8 0 8Reinsurance, and Risk Corridorsi
DifferenceBaselineBaseline
Change in Insurance Coverage Under the ACA in 2024
 (Millions of nonelderly people, by calendar year)a
Effects on the Cumulative Federal Deficit, 2015 to 2024e
(Billions of dollars)
February 2014 April 2014 
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Factors That Led to Changes in the Estimates 
Since February 2014
The reductions in estimated federal costs are the net 
result of a combination of factors. The current 
projections: 
 Incorporate the economic forecast that CBO 
published in February 2014; because the projections 
of the effects of the ACA’s coverage provisions 
published in February were partial and preliminary, 
they did not incorporate the economic forecast 
published by CBO at that time. 
 Incorporate further analyses by CBO and JCT of 
exchange premiums and the characteristics of 
exchange plans.
 Include revisions to estimates of the number of early 
retirees with employment-based coverage under the 
ACA.
 Account for regulations and other administrative 
actions that were put in place between early December 
2013 and the end of March 2014. 
Because of the way that various factors interact, it is not 
possible to isolate the effects of changes in individual fac-
tors on specific components of the budgetary effects. 
Changes From Incorporating the February 2014 
Economic Forecast. In CBO’s most recent economic fore-
cast, published in February 2014, the agency revised its 
projections of various economic factors that will affect the 
number of people who will be eligible for subsidized 
insurance coverage under the ACA.21 Changes in esti-
mates of labor force participation, wages and salaries, 
and population had the largest effects on projections of 
eligibility for subsidized coverage. 
The projected labor force participation rate among peo-
ple younger than age 65 is lower throughout the next 
decade than it was in the forecast CBO published in 
2013. In 2020, for example, CBO now anticipates that 
this participation rate will be 75.9 percent, compared 
with the 76.5 percent it projected previously.22 The 
downward revision stems from a variety of factors, and it 
results in a slightly larger projection of the number of 
people who will be eligible for Medicaid, CHIP, and 
subsidies in the exchanges. 
Wages and salaries also are projected to be lower through 
most of the next decade than they were in CBO’s previ-
ous forecast—by between 4 percent and 5 percent, for 
example, from 2018 through 2023. The result of that and 
other changes to the income projections, including 
changes to the projected distribution of income, is a 
slight increase in Medicaid eligibility and a slight decrease 
in eligibility for premium subsidies. 
CBO revised its projection of the total population under 
the age of 65 as a result of incorporating recently available 
information from the 2010 decennial census. Under the 
revised projection, the nonelderly population during 
the years from 2014 to 2024 is 2 million to 4 million 
people smaller than it was in the previous projection. 
Taken together with information on the employment-
based health insurance market, that change resulted most 
notably in a downward revision of CBO and JCT’s pro-
jection of the number of people without insurance in the 
absence of the ACA during the early years of the coming 
decade. 
In addition, CBO and JCT made a related technical 
adjustment on the basis of a more detailed analysis of sur-
vey data. The agencies altered their projections of the age 
mix of people who would have been without insurance in 
the absence of the ACA, reducing the projected share 
of children in that group. As discussed later, that change 
affects CBO and JCT’s projection of the number of 
people who will enroll in Medicaid and CHIP under 
the ACA.
Changes in Estimated Exchange Premiums. In the 
February 2014 projections, CBO and JCT reduced their 
estimate of exchange premiums for 2014. However, no 
changes were made to premium projections for later years 
because the February update was partial and preliminary. 
The current update of the baseline incorporates the 
results of additional analyses of the premiums charged for 
21. See Congressional Budget Office, The Budget and Economic 
Outlook: 2014 to 2024, Chapter 2 (February 2014), 
www.cbo.gov/publication/45010. 
22. CBO regularly publishes forecasts of labor force participation for 
people of all ages, but not for people under age 65. Those 
published rates show a similar revision. 
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2014, resulting in changes to the estimates for 2014 and 
for later years. 
A crucial factor in the current revision was an analysis of 
the characteristics of plans offered through the exchanges 
in 2014. Previously, CBO and JCT had expected that 
those plans’ characteristics would closely resemble the 
characteristics of employment-based plans throughout 
the projection period. However, the plans being offered 
through the exchanges this year appear to have, in 
general, lower payment rates for providers, narrower 
networks of providers, and tighter management of their 
subscribers’ use of health care than employment-based 
plans do.
CBO and JCT anticipate that, as enrollment in the 
exchanges rises, the differences between employment-
based plans and exchange plans will narrow. Therefore, 
projected premiums during the next few years were 
revised downward more than were premiums for the later 
years of the coming decade. 
The lower exchange premiums and revisions to the other 
characteristics of insurance plans that are incorporated 
into CBO and JCT’s current estimates have small effects 
on the agencies’ projections of exchange enrollment. 
Although lower premiums will tend to increase enroll-
ment, narrower networks and more tightly managed ben-
efits will tend to reduce the attractiveness of plans and 
thereby decrease enrollment. The net effect on projected 
enrollment in the exchanges is small. 
Lower premiums also have the effect of reducing the fed-
eral cost of exchange subsidies. The current estimate of 
the average subsidy for 2014 is about $300 (or 6 percent) 
less than the estimate in the February 2014 baseline, and 
the estimate for 2024 is about $1,200 (or 14 percent) 
below the earlier projection. The reductions in subsidies 
relative to the previous baseline are smaller for 2014 than 
for later years because, in February, CBO and JCT 
updated their estimates of exchange premiums and 
subsidies for 2014 but did not make changes to those 
estimates for 2015 or later years. 
Changes in the Estimates of the Number of People With 
Employment-Based Coverage. CBO and JCT have 
revised their projections both of the number of people 
and of the groups of people who will obtain coverage 
from current or former employers. As a result of several 
technical modeling adjustments, the agencies’ estimates 
of active workers and their dependents with such cover-
age have been revised upward by about 1 million people 
in most years. At the same time, CBO and JCT have 
revised downward their estimates of the number of non-
elderly retirees with health insurance from a previous 
employer. Part of that revision stems from a reevaluation 
of the decline in retiree coverage over the past decade in 
the absence of the ACA. Another part is attributable to an 
assessment that more employers than previously thought 
will decide not to offer retiree coverage under the ACA—
both because of the availability of the exchanges and 
other new sources of coverage and because they face no 
penalty for declining to offer coverage to retirees. Those 
considerations led CBO and JCT to reduce their projec-
tions—by about 2 million people in most years—of the 
number of early retirees and their dependents who will be 
covered by employment-based health insurance under the 
ACA and to increase their projections of the number who 
will enroll in the exchanges. 
The net effect of the upward revision in coverage of active 
workers and the downward revision in coverage of retired 
workers is a downward revision—by about 1 million peo-
ple for most years—in the projection of the number of 
people with employment-based coverage under the ACA.
CBO and JCT anticipate that the effect on tax revenues 
from employers’ declining to offer coverage to retirees 
will be significantly smaller than the effect of such a 
decision regarding active employees. The decision of 
employers not to offer health insurance to active employ-
ees generally boosts federal revenues in two ways—by 
raising employees’ taxable compensation and by raising 
penalties paid by employers who are subject to the ACA’s 
requirements concerning employment-based coverage. 
For retirees’ coverage, however, a smaller portion of pre-
mium costs tends to be excluded from taxable income, so 
replacing retirees’ coverage with an increase in other 
forms of employee compensation generates less additional 
tax revenue than would a similar change involving active 
employees. Also, as noted, employers face no penalty for 
not offering coverage to retirees.
Regulations and Other Administrative Actions. The 
Administration has released several proposed and final 
regulations and announced other actions regarding 
implementation of the ACA since early December 2013, 
when CBO’s February 2014 baseline projections were 
completed. The implications for CBO and JCT’s projec-
tions of four significant actions are described here. 
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Employers’ Responsibilities in 2015. Under the ACA, cer-
tain employers with 50 or more FTE employees that do 
not offer health insurance coverage that meets the stan-
dards specified in law will be subject to penalties. That 
requirement initially was to take effect in January 2014, 
but in July 2013 the Administration delayed the require-
ment by one year and set it to take effect in January 
2015.23 That delay was incorporated into CBO and 
JCT’s February 2014 projections.
In February 2014, the Department of the Treasury issued 
a final regulation providing additional transitional relief 
to employers. Employers with at least 50 but fewer than 
100 FTE employees will be exempt from the employer 
requirement in 2015 if they certify that they have not 
made certain reductions to health insurance coverage or 
reduced their number of FTE employees to avoid the 
penalties. That final regulation also provided for a one-
year relaxation of a related coverage requirement for 
employers subject to the requirement. That change took 
two forms. First, in 2015, those employers must offer 
coverage to at least 70 percent of their full-time employ-
ees—rather than the 95 percent specified in the proposed 
regulation. Second, in 2015, employers with at least 
100 FTE employees are permitted to exclude the first 
80 full-time employees from the penalty calculation 
(rather than the first 30 full-time employees, as will be 
the case in subsequent years). 
That additional transitional relief was not included in the 
February 2014 projections. Incorporating the effects of 
that regulation led CBO and JCT to estimate slightly 
lower enrollment in employment-based coverage in 2015 
and to estimate slightly less in revenues from penalties 
paid by employers in 2016. (Because penalties are col-
lected the year after they are assessed, the 2015 delay will 
reduce collections in 2016.)
Availability of Noncompliant Plans. Under the ACA, 
health insurance policies sold by insurers must—in most 
cases—comply with certain rules, among them a prohibi-
tion on adjusting premiums on the basis of an applicant’s 
health status and a requirement that insurers in the 
nongroup and small-group markets offer plans to all 
applicants that cover certain essential health benefits and 
that pay a specified minimum share of the cost of covered 
benefits. Those requirements apply to plans sold both 
within and outside of the exchanges. (For more informa-
tion on the nongroup market under the ACA, see Box 1 
on page 8.) However, in March 2014, the Department of 
Health and Human Services announced that, through 
October 1, 2016, state insurance commissioners could 
permit health insurers to re-enroll individuals and 
small businesses in existing plans that do not comply with 
certain market and benefit rules that took effect in 
2014, allowing such coverage to continue through 
September 2017. That announcement extended an 
action announced in November 2013 that permitted the 
renewal of noncompliant policies through October 1, 
2014 (extending that coverage through September 2015). 
CBO and JCT estimate that the March 2014 announce-
ment will slightly reduce enrollment in ACA-compliant 
plans because some people will take advantage of this 
option by renewing their coverage in noncompliant 
plans. CBO and JCT also estimate that the March 
announcement will slightly reduce spending for exchange 
subsidies because some people who would have enrolled 
in a subsidized plan through the exchanges will instead 
renew coverage in noncompliant plans (which cannot be 
sold through the exchanges and are not subsidized). In 
addition, the lower premiums that small employers and 
self-employed people are likely to pay for noncompliant 
plans will generate a small amount of additional tax 
revenues because of those enrollees’ resulting increased 
taxable income. 
CBO and JCT expect that people who renew non-
compliant plans will be healthier, on average, than 
people who enroll in ACA-compliant plans, leading to 
slightly higher medical claims per enrollee among ACA-
compliant plans. However, CBO and JCT expect that 
such adjustments will have a negligible effect on average 
premiums in exchange plans because the number of peo-
ple who re-enroll in noncompliant plans will probably be 
small relative to total enrollment in exchange plans.
Risk Corridors. The ACA established several programs to 
reduce the risk of financial losses faced by insurers. Under 
the temporary risk corridor program, the government will 
make payments during the next few years to companies 
that offer individual and small-group plans sold on the 
exchanges (and will make payments for certain plans sold 
outside of the exchanges if the plans are substantially the 
23. For an estimate of the budgetary effects of that delay, see 
Congressional Budget Office, letter to the Honorable Paul Ryan 
providing an analysis of the Administration’s announced delay of 
certain requirements under the Affordable Care Act (July 30, 
2013), www.cbo.gov/publication/44465.
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same as plans sold by the same carriers within the 
exchanges) when actual costs for medical claims exceed 
expected costs by certain percentages. At the same time, 
the government will receive payments from those plans 
whose actual costs for medical claims fall short of their 
expected costs by certain percentages.24
In March 2014, the Department of Health and Human 
Services issued a final regulation stating that its imple-
mentation of the risk corridor program will result in 
equal payments to and from the government, and thus 
will have no net budgetary effect. CBO believes that the 
Administration has sufficient flexibility to ensure that 
payments to insurers will approximately equal payments 
from insurers to the federal government, and thus that 
the program will have no net budgetary effect over the 
three years of its operation. (Previously, CBO had esti-
mated that the risk corridor program would yield net 
budgetary savings of $8 billion.) 
Hardship Exemption. In December 2013, the Department 
of Health and Human Services announced that it was 
allowing people whose nongroup plans were canceled by 
their insurers for 2014 to apply for a hardship waiver that 
would allow them either to remain uninsured without 
paying a penalty or to purchase lower-cost catastrophic 
coverage (plans with particularly high out-of-pocket costs 
for which most people would not ordinarily be eligible 
under the ACA).25 In March 2014, the Department of 
Health and Human Services announced that this hard-
ship waiver would be extended until October 1, 2016.26 
People who apply for this hardship waiver will need to 
verify that they had been covered by a health insurance 
plan that was canceled. Because CBO and JCT expect 
that most of the people whose plans have been canceled 
will seek alternative sources of coverage rather than 
become uninsured, the agencies expect that this 
additional hardship exemption will have a negligible 
effect on the amount of penalties collected from unin-
sured people. In addition, CBO and JCT expect that, for 
three reasons, a very small number of people who are per-
mitted to enroll in a catastrophic plan will actually do so: 
Catastrophic plans have lower actuarial value than other 
types of coverage, people who enroll in catastrophic plans 
are ineligible for exchange subsidies, and CBO and JCT 
expect that many people either obtained coverage from 
another source for 2014 before the announcement or 
were unaware of that option at the time they sought 
coverage.
Changes in the Estimates Since February 2014
CBO and JCT currently estimate that the insurance cov-
erage provisions of the ACA will have a net cost over the 
2015–2024 period that is $104 billion less than the agen-
cies estimated in February 2014. The difference stems 
from the following changes in estimates of the govern-
ment’s spending and collections (see Figure 2 on page 19 
and Table 4 on page 14):
 A reduction of $165 billion (or 8 percent) in the gross 
cost of the coverage provisions, almost entirely because 
exchange subsidies and related spending are now 
projected to cost $1,032 billion, compared with the 
previous estimate of $1,197 billion; and
 A partially offsetting net reduction of $61 billion in 
savings as a result of lower expected penalty payments 
from uninsured people and employers, higher 
expected revenue resulting from the excise tax on 
certain high-premium employment-based insurance 
plans, and lower savings from other budgetary effects 
(mostly decreases in tax revenues).
Exchange Subsidies and Related Spending. CBO and 
JCT have not changed their previous estimate of the 
number of people who will purchase coverage through 
the exchanges in 2014. After 2014, however, CBO and 
JCT’s estimates of enrollment are slightly higher than 
those in the previous projection—by less than 1 million 
people annually for most years. That increase has various 
origins, as discussed above, including lower expected 
premiums in the exchanges and less expected employ-
ment-based coverage for early retirees, both of which 
would increase the number of people purchasing insur-
ance through the exchanges. Partially offsetting those 
factors are a slight downward shift in the expected 
income distribution (which reduces the number of people 
anticipated to be eligible for exchange subsidies) and 
24. For more information, see Congressional Budget Office, The 
Budget and Economic Outlook: 2014 to 2024, Appendix B 
(February 2014), www.cbo.gov/publication/45010. 
25. See Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, “Options 
Available for Consumers With Cancelled Policies” (December 19, 
2013), http://go.usa.gov/KHTw (PDF, 110 KB).
26. See Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, “Insurance 
Standards Bulletin Series—Extension of Transitional Policy 
Through October 1, 2016” (March 5, 2014), http://go.usa.gov/
KHbh (PDF, 148 KB).
APRIL 2014 UPDATED ESTIMATES OF THE EFFECTS OF THE INSURANCE COVERAGE PROVISIONS OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT, APRIL 2014 19
CBO
Figure 2.
Budgetary Effects of the Insurance Coverage Provisions of the Affordable Care Act, 2015 to 2024 
Sources: Congressional Budget Office; staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation.
Note: CHIP = Children’s Health Insurance Program.
changes in the expected characteristics of plans that will 
be offered in the exchanges (which will make them less 
attractive than previously expected). 
CBO and JCT project that the government’s costs for 
exchange subsidies and related spending in 2014 will be 
$3 billion (or 16 percent) less than previously projected. 
Despite projecting that slightly more people will receive 
insurance coverage through exchanges over the 2015–
2024 period than they had anticipated previously, CBO 
and JCT project that costs for exchange subsidies and 
related spending will be $164 billion (or 14 percent) 
below the previous projection, mainly because of the 
downward revision to expected exchange premiums, as 
follows: 
 Premium assistance tax credits total $855 billion in 
the current projection, a reduction of $181 billion (or 
17 percent) from the previous projection.27 
 Cost-sharing subsidies are now projected to be 
$175 billion, about $8 billion more than in the 
previous projection; that change is attributable to the 
slight downward shift in the expected income 
distribution.
 The risk corridor program is expected to have no net 
budgetary effect over the three years of its operation, 
rather than the $8 billion in net savings to the 
government previously anticipated.
Medicaid and CHIP Outlays. CBO and JCT’s projection 
of the federal cost of the additional enrollment in Medic-
aid and CHIP under the ACA has changed little since the 
February 2014 projection. For 2014, the projection was 
revised from $19 billion to $20 billion; for the 2015–
2024 period, the projection remains at $792 billion. The 
negligible net revision reflects a combination of offsetting 
changes in enrollment and per capita costs. 
For 2014 through 2016, CBO and JCT have reduced 
their projections of additional Medicaid and CHIP 
enrollment stemming from the ACA by about 1 million 
people each year. For those years, the changes discussed 
above in the estimated number of people without insur-
ance in the absence of the ACA and the estimated mix of 
adults and children within that population generated a 
downward revision in the number of children expected to 
newly enroll in CHIP and a smaller upward revision in 
the number of adults expected to newly enroll in Medic-
aid as a result of the ACA. Because anticipated per capita 
Total Cost
Other Effects




Medicaid and CHIP Outlays
Exchange Subsidies and Related Spending




27. The current estimate is the sum of $726 billion in outlays for the 
premium credits and a $129 billion reduction in revenues 
resulting from those credits (see Table 3 on page 10). 
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costs are much higher for newly eligible adults than for 
children (and because of some other small technical 
changes), the projections for federal spending for Medic-
aid and CHIP have been revised upward by about 
$2 billion for the 2014–2016 period, despite the 
downward revision in projected enrollment.
CBO and JCT raised their projections of additional 
Medicaid enrollment stemming from the ACA by fewer 
than 1 million people in each year between 2018 and 
2024 (for 2017, projected enrollment is essentially 
unchanged). That revision results mainly from the 
changes in the projected income distribution and pro-
jected labor force participation, discussed above. Higher 
enrollment would increase federal costs, all else being 
equal. However, the projection for spending per adult 
Medicaid recipient has been revised downward slightly on 
the basis of recent data. The combination of higher 
enrollment and lower costs per capita led to small upward 
revisions to projected outlays between 2018 and 2020, to 
essentially no change in 2021, and to small downward 
revisions to outlays projected for 2022 through 2024. 
Small-Employer Tax Credits. CBO and JCT have made 
essentially no changes to their projections of small-
employer tax credits since February 2014.
Penalty Payments by Uninsured People. Uninsured 
people are now expected to pay about $6 billion less in 
penalties during the 2015–2024 period than CBO and 
JCT projected previously. That reduction is attributable 
to several factors. First, because of various changes dis-
cussed above, the agencies now expect that, in most years, 
about 1 million fewer people will be uninsured than the 
agencies expected in February. In addition, a shift in 
the projected income distribution leaves a smaller share 
of the uninsured population subject to the penalty, and it 
leaves fewer people who are subject to the penalty with 
income high enough that they would pay a percentage of 
their income as a penalty rather than pay a lesser flat rate. 
The reduction in projected payments does not result 
from recent administrative actions to widen the hardship 
exemption; CBO and JCT expect that those actions will 
have only negligible effects on payments because most of 
the people eligible for that exemption will seek alternative 
sources of coverage rather than become uninsured. 
Penalty Payments by Employers. Since preparing the 
February 2014 projection, CBO and JCT have reduced 
by $12 billion their estimate of penalty payments that 
will be collected from employers during the 2015–2024 
period. About $3 billion of that reduction occurs in 
2016, mainly as a result of the recently issued final rule 
providing transitional relief for employers (discussed 
above). The rest is attributable to a small increase in the 
number of active workers and their dependents who 
are expected to enroll in employment-based coverage 
compared with the number in the February baseline. 
Excise Tax on High-Premium Insurance Plans. Since 
February, CBO and JCT have increased by $12 billion 
their projection of revenues resulting from the excise tax 
on certain insurance plans with high premiums collected 
over the 2015–2024 period. That upward revision 
resulted primarily from an expected increase in the 
number of active employees receiving employment-based 
coverage.
Other Effects on Revenues and Outlays. CBO and JCT 
now anticipate that the ACA’s insurance coverage provi-
sions will have other effects on revenues and outlays that 
will, on net, reduce the deficit by $54 billion less than 
was anticipated previously for the 2015–2024 period. 
The current projection is for a reduction in the deficit of 
$152 billion, rather than $206 billion, for that decade.
The downward revision in those savings stems principally 
from the projected increase in the number of active work-
ers and their dependents with employment-based 
health insurance. An employer’s decision not to offer 
insurance to active employees tends to result in higher 
taxable compensation in the form of wages and salaries. 
Conversely, an increase in employment-based health 
insurance tends to reduce taxable compensation. There-
fore, the increase in the number of active workers and 
their dependents with employment-based coverage 
implies lower federal revenues than would otherwise 
be the case.
Changes in the Estimates Since the 
Enactment of the ACA
CBO and JCT have updated their baseline estimates of 
the budgetary effects of the ACA’s insurance coverage 
provisions many times since that legislation was enacted 
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Figure 3.
Comparison of CBO and JCT’s Estimates of the Net Budgetary Effects of the 
Coverage Provisions of the Affordable Care Act
(Billions of dollars, by fiscal year)
Sources: Congressional Budget Office; staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation.
in March 2010 (see Figure 3). As time has passed, pro-
jected costs over the subsequent 10 years have risen 
because the period spanned by the estimates has changed: 
Each time a year goes by, a less expensive early year is 
replaced by a more expensive later year. But when com-
pared year by year, CBO and JCT’s estimates of the 
net budgetary impact of the ACA’s insurance coverage 
provisions have decreased, on balance, over the past four 
years.28 
In March 2010, CBO and JCT projected that the provi-
sions of the ACA related to health insurance coverage 
would cost the federal government $759 billion during 
fiscal years 2014 through 2019 (2019 was the last year of 
the 10-year budget window used in that estimate). The 
newest projections indicate that those provisions will 
cost $659 billion over that same period, a reduction of 
13 percent. For 2019, for example, CBO and JCT pro-
jected in March 2010 that the ACA’s insurance coverage 
provisions would have a net federal cost of $172 billion; 
the current projections show a cost of $144 billion—a 
reduction of 16 percent.
The net downward revision since March 2010 to CBO 
and JCT’s estimates of the net federal cost of the ACA’s 
insurance coverage provisions (when measured on a year-
by-year basis) is attributable to many factors. Changes in 
law, revisions to CBO’s economic projections, judicial 
decisions, administrative actions, new data, and numer-
ous improvements in CBO and JCT’s modeling have all 
affected the projections. A notable influence is the sub-
stantial downward revision to projected health care costs 
both for the federal government and for the private sec-
tor. For example, since early 2010, CBO and JCT have 
revised downward their projections of insurance premi-
ums for policies purchased through the exchanges in 
2016 by roughly 15 percent, and CBO has revised 
downward its projection of total Medicaid spending per 
beneficiary in 2016 by roughly half that percentage.


















28. For an illustration of several baseline projections between March 
2010 and May 2013, see Congressional Budget Office, “CBO’s 
Estimate of the Net Budgetary Impact of the Affordable Care Act’s 
Health Insurance Coverage Provisions Has Not Changed Much 
Over Time,” CBO Blog (May 14, 2013), www.cbo.gov/
publication/44176.
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